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Edward Douglass White
[In April, the Law School sponsored a lecture by
Mr. Peter Fitzpatrick, a distinguished member of the
Chicago Bar, on Chief Justice Edward Douglass
White. Mr. Fitzpatrick's paper follows.]
When Wilson named Brandeis to the Supreme
Court seven past presidents of the American Bar Asso­
ciation testified against his confirmation. Ex-president
Taft wrote to his wife: HI hope White will not end
his judicial career with an apoplectic fit caused by
the nomination."! At about this time Brandeis con­
ferred with White. Perhaps, because the opposition
to Brandeis recalled to White's memory the charge
of bribery that once had been leveled against him
when he fought the Louisiana Lottery, he immediately
accepted Brandeis and insisted that Brandeis should
look on him not as the Chief Justice but as a father.
Following this meeting, in circulating a draft opinion,
Brandeis wrote on the copy to be delivered to White,
"Father Chief Justice." In returning the draft opinion,
White showed appreciation of the spirit of the ex-
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soldier, but if the soldier had the patriotism, and yet
felt compelled to run away when that was needed, he
was not of much use.
Together with honesty you must have the second
of the virile virtues, courage; courage to dare, courage
to withstand the wrong and to fight aggressively and
vigorously for the right.
And if you have only honesty and courage, you may
yet be an entirely worthless citizen. An honest and
valiant fool has but a small place of usefulness in the
body politic. With honesty, with courage, must go
common sense: ability to work with your fellows,
ability when you go out of the academic halls to work
with the men of this nation, the millions of men who
have not an academic training, who will accept your
leadership on just one consideration, and that is if you
show yourself in the rough work of actual life fit and
able to lead, and only so.
You need honesty, you need courage, and you need
common sense. Above all you need it in the work to
be done in the building the corner-stone of which we
laid today, the law school out of which is to come the
men who at the bar and on the bench make and
construe, and in construing, make the laws of this
country; the men who must teach by their actions to
all our people that this is in fact essentially a govern­
ment of orderly liberty under the law.
Men and women, you the graduates of this univer­
sity, you the undergraduates, upon you rests a heavy
burden of responsibility; much has been given to you;
much will be expected from you. A great work lies
before you. If you fail in it you discredit yourselves,
you discredit the whole cause of education. And you
can succeed and will succeed if you work in the spirit
of the words and the deeds of President Harper and
of those men whom I have known so well who are in
your faculty today.
I thank you for having given me the chance to speak
to you.
White-
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change by addressing his new colleague as "Grand­
father Justice Brandeis."2
Another instance of White's playing the father role
is revealed in Holmes complaining to Laski, "The
C.J., who occasionally speaks to me as if I were un­
known to the world at large, said the people thought
I didn't work when I fired off decisions soon after
they were given to me."3
Umbreit wrote of Edward Douglass White that he
looked so much like a Chief Justice that he might
have merited the position on appearance alone." He
refers to him as a monumental man, who gave the
impression of massive strength. William Howard
Taft, who appointed him Chief Justice and later suc­
ceeded him in that office, said of White, "Massive,
dignified, impressive as was his physical mould, his
mental structure was like it. ... His capacity for work
was enormous."5 Indeed, while he was a member of
the Louisiana Supreme Court White wrote 80 opin­
ions in 14 months." During his 27 years on the Su­
preme Court of the United States he prepared more
than 700 opinions.P" His memory was prodigious. His
opinions, which were usually lengthy, he delivered
orally.
He showed a strong sense of judicial responsibility.
Taft, after pointing out that the study of cases with
a view to their decision in conference is a greater task
than the preparation of opinions, stated that no one
could have been more conscientious in this regard
than Chief Justice White." In the opinions themselves
White's sense of responsibility impelled him to dwell
continually on the "consequences" that might follow
a particular decision.
A suggestion of his general view in all cases is
is revealed in Holmes' complaining to Laski, "The
A. B. Dick Co. sold a mimeographing machine to
which was attached a plate which stated "This ma­
chine is sold . . . with the license restriction that it
may be used only with the stencil-paper, ink and other
supplies made by A. B. Dick Co." The purchaser of
the machine bought ink from another manufacturer,
and the A. B. Dick Co. sued this manufacturer alleg­
ing an infringement of its patent. A majority of the
court held with A. B. Dick Co. White's dissent fore­
shadowed the present majority view of the Supreme
Court. His argument in part follows:
"My reluctance to dissent is overcome in this
case: First, because the ruling now made has a
much wider scope than the mere interest of the
parties to this record, since, in my opinion, the
effect of that ruling is to destroy, in a very large
measure, the judicial authority of the States by
unwarrantedly extending the Federal judicial
power. Second, because the result just stated, by
the inevitable development of the principle an­
nounced, may not be confined to sporadic or
isolated cases, but will be as broad as society
itself, affecting a multitude of people and capable
of operation upon every conceivable subject of
human contract, interest or activity, however in­
tensely local and exclusively within state author­
ity they otherwise might be. Third, because the
gravity of the consequences which would ordi­
narily arise from such a result is greatly aggra­
vated by the ruling now made, since that ruling
not only vastly extends the Federal judicial power,
as above stated, but as to all the innumerable
subjects to which the ruling may be made to
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apply, makes it the duty of the courts of the
United States to test the rights and obligations
of the parties, not by the general law of the land,
in accord with the conformity act, but by the
provisions of the patent law, even although the
subjects considered may not be within the em­
brace of that law, thus disregarding the state law,
overthrowing, it may be, the settled public policy
of the State, and injuriously affecting a multitude
of persons....
"I cannot bring my mind to assent to the con­
clusion referred to, and shall state in the light
of reason and authority why I cannot do so. As
I have said, the ink was not covered by the pat­
ent; . . . This curious anomaly then results, that
which was not embraced by the patent, which
could not have been embraced therein and which
if mistakenly allowed and included in an express
claim would have been inefficacious, is now by
the effect of a contract held to be embraced by
the patent and covered by the patent law....
"
This paper will be concerned with White's contri­
bution to the development of American law, prin­
cipally in the antitrust field and in the field of admin­
istrative law. But, first, it will briefly sketch his
family background and his career before he reached
the Supreme Court.
He was of the fourth generation of Whites to be
prominent in the American scene and the third gener­
ation to serve as a judge. His great grandfather, James
White, was born in Ireland and came to America
as a young man. He became prominent as a merchant
in Philadelphia, and his name appears as a signer of
the Non-importation Agreement of 1765. That he
was of some scholarly bent is shown by his will, in
which he left his Latin books to his son, also named
James. The second James White, the Chief Justice's
grandfather, studied medicine. He moved to Fayette­
ville, North Carolina, and was elected a member of
the Continental Congress from North Carolina in
May of 1786, and soon after was appointed the first
U. S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Southern
Department. His interest in the efforts of the Con­
tinental Congress to draft the Constitution is shown
by a letter to Governor Richard Caswell of North
Carolina. After a short stay in North Carolina he
moved to Davidson County, Tennessee, and was
elected a delegate to the Territorial Assembly and by
the Assembly was elected a delegate to the Congress
of the United States from Tennessee. He was ad­
mitted to the bar in 1890. His son, Edward Douglass,
the father of the Chief Justice, was born in Nashville
in March 1794. In the same year, James White intro­
duced a bill in the Assembly of the Territory of Ten­
nessee to found· Grenville College. He moved to
Louisiana in 1799, at about the same time Daniel
Boone moved into Missouri. After the Louisiana Pur­
chase, in 1803, Jefferson appointed him a judge. He
served on the bench until his death six years later.
His son, the first Edward Douglass, became judge
of the City Court of New Orleans in 1825, at the
age of 31. He was elected to Congress in 1831 and
served three terms consecutively. One of his contem­
poraries in Congress was David Crockett. He voted
for the Compromise Tariff in 1833. That caused his
defeat, when he ran for his 4th term in Congress,
but in the next year he was elected Governor of
Louisiana on the Whig ticket. He served with dis­
tinction as Governor. Under Louisiana law the Gov­
ernor was not eligible for a second consecutive term.
However, he served two more terms in Congress
before he retired to his sugar plantation. There the
Chief Justice was born, on November 3, 1845. White's
mother was Catharine Sidney Ringgold, a daughter
of a pioneer Maryland family, whom the Chief Jus­
tice's father had met while serving in Congress. The
Chief Justice's uncle is the Ringgold immortalized in
the song, "Maryland my Maryland."9 White's father
died in 1847 at the age of 53. His mother married
again, to a man named Brousseau.
White was enrolled in the College Preparatory De­
partment of the Jesuit School in New Orleans at the
age of 6. Four years later, he attended Mount St.
Mary's in Emmitsburg, Maryland. After a year in
this school, he transferred to Georgetown College,
where he remained until the outbreak of the Civil
War in 1860. That ended his formal education at 15
years of age, except for a few months when he is
believed to have studied in the Jesuit College in New
Orleans during the following year.
At 16, White enlisted to fight for the Confederacy
as a private. He was promoted to the staff of Brig.
General Beale. He saw active service and was taken
prisoner at the Battle of Fort Hudson in 1863.
In 1865, at 20, he commenced the study of law in
the office of Edward Bermudez. Louisiana, of course,
retained the civil law as enacted in the Code Napoleon,
so all White's early training was in Civil Law. But
after White was admitted to practice, at age 23, he
applied himself to the study of the common law as well
as the civil law, so that he might represent clients with
litigation in the federal courts. In a short time, he
developed a successful practice in both the state and
federal courts.
He was also active in politics and took part in the
fight of the people of Louisiana against the carpetbag
government of the reconstruction era. He is reported
to have used a musket in an armed battle on the levee
to overthrow the Kellogg Government. He was elected
in 1874, at age 29, to the Louisiana Senate where he
served one term. Then Governor Nichols appointed
him an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
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Louisiana.
The theme of White's political life in Louisiana
was the bitter fight carried on by the Nichols forces
against the corrupt state lottery. In the end Nichols
and White triumphed and the lottery was abolished,
but the struggle had its ups and downs. At about
the time of White's appointment to the State Supreme
Court, the Nichols administration got the legislature
to revoke the charter of the 'lottery company.
After White began his service on the State Supreme
Court the anti Nichols-White forces succeeded in
amending the state constitution to write the lottery
into the state's fundamenal law and to set up a new
Supreme Court. The entire court was out. White
was always proud of his service on the State Court,
because during the short period of his service the
court caught up on its docket, which had been heavily
in arrears.
During the next decade White did not hold political
office. He devoted himself to the practice of law,
forming a partnership, first of Spencer & White and
later White, Parlange & Saunders. His practice was
successful. White was primarily a student. He spent
almost all his time, not taken up in court appearances,
in his office. It was said that there the light seldom
was extinguished until dawn. To pursue his research
in civil law he would consult the original sources in
Latin, Italian, Spanish and French. French, indeed,
was a second mother tongue to him, and the other
languages he spoke and read RuentIy. He lived in
the French Quarter of New Orleans until he moved
to Washington, and a great deal of his law practice
was from the French community. In fact, some
thought that the family name had originally been
Le Blanc. Even after his ascent to the Supreme Court
he continued his interest in languages and late in
life undertook the study of German. By his years of
practice in New Orleans, White earned universal
regard as a great lawyer with a profound knowledge
of both civil and common law.
During the same period, he was one of the moving
figures in founding Tulane University. In 1882, when
White was 37, Paul Tulane of Princeton, New Jersey,
placed a large endowment in the hands of trustees,
including White, to found a university. Believing
that the cause of education in Louisiana would be
strengthened if the proposed university were to be
combined with the State University, White devised
a plan, implemented by a constitutional amendment,
which allowed a transfer of the State University to
the Tulane trustees to found what is now known as
Tulane University. White remained associated with
the administration of the University until 1897.
White was active in Bar Association activities. He
became a member of the New Orleans Law Associ­
ation (the predecessor to the Louisiana State Bar
Association), on June 10, 1871, and after leaving the
State Supreme bench he took an active part in the
affairs of the Association. On November 20, 1880,
he was made a member of its committee on member­
ship. This position he retained until after his election
as United States Senator. This committee also passed
on complaints against lawyers of unprofessional con­
duct. On November 17, 1883, he moved the appoint­
ment of a committee (on which he served) to reor­
ganize the keeping of the records of the District
Court of Orleans Parish. The following year he was
a member of the committee to persuade the State
Legislature to transfer the law books in the State Li­
brary to the Law Association. White also served as
chairman of the State Board of Bar Examiners.
In 1888, then 43 years old, he returned to politics
and became campaign manager for Nichols in his
bid for another term as governor. The issue was the
notorious Louisiana lottery. Nichols won the election
and rewarded White by supporting him for the United
States Senate. He became Senator on December 7,
1891, and served until he was appointed by Grover
Cleveland, in March 1894, an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Shortly after his appointment to the Supreme Court,
White married Mrs. Leita Montgomery Kent, a widow
of a Washington lawyer, an old friend of his, and a
sister-in-law of the late Senator Gibson of Louisiana.
They had no children. The Whites became known
as an hospitable couple, famous for good food and
good conversation. He was on intimate terms with
senators and congressmen and other public figures.
After he joined the Supreme Court all other activ­
ities were subordinated to the work of the court. For
example, in spite of his continuing interest in George­
town University, he refused its offer of a chair in the
law school, although Harlan and others combined
teaching with service on the Supreme Court. He
resigned as vice president of the board of Tulane
University. He even refused to attend dinners of the
Gridiron Club, because of his care for the dignity of
the court. When President McKinley offered him
a place on the commission to negotiate peace between
Spain and the United States in 1898, he declined the
appointment.
His friendship with Theodore Roosevelt began in
1901. At that time Roosevelt sought his advice on
the question of beginning legal studies which would
occupy his time and fit him to be a better presiding
officer in the Senate. White advised him that attend­
ing a law school would be derogatory to the office
of Vice President. He proposed that Roosevelt read
law books from a list prepared by White and that
White would give him a quiz every Saturday after­
noon. The work was to have started in the Fall, but
the plan was abandoned when Mckinley's assassina-
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tion made Roosevelt President.
Roosevelt in a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, dis­
cussing Lurton's fitness for the Supreme Court, said,
"On every question that had come before the bench,
he has so far shown himself to be in much closer
touch with the policies in which you and I believe
than even White, because he has been right about
corporations where White has been wrong."lO White's
point of view on legal and economic questions was
much closer to President Taft's than to Roosevelt's.
In 1909 and in 1910, Taft consulted White about
appointments to vacancies on the court. As late as
the campaign of 1916, Taft sought information from
White concerning whether Hughes would accept the
Republican nomination for the presidency. White
assured Taft that he would."! Taft appointed White
Chief Justice in December of 1910. The appointment
was generally well received.
Before the appointment and after Fuller's death,
Holmes wrote to Pollock as follows: "As to the Chief
Justiceship I am rather at a loss. I should bet he will
appoint Hughes, who has given up a chance of being
Republican nominee for the Presidency, but I know
nothing. I think White, who is next in Seniority to
Harlan (too old, etc.) the ablest man likely to be
thought of. I don't know whether his being a Catholic
would interfere. I always have assumed absolutely
that I should not be regarded as possible-they don"
appoint side Judges, as a rule. It would be embar­
rassing to skip my Seniors, and I am too old. I think
I should be a better administrator than White, but
he would be more politic. Also the President's incli­
nation so far as I can judge seems to me towards a
type for which I have but a limited admiration. I
am afraid White has about as little chance as 1."12
Taft's brother, Horace, wrote to the President, De­
cember 15, 1910: "The appointment of White was
glorious . . . I see nothing but favorable comment."13
The confirmation of the new appointment by the
Senate came within 15 minutes of its reception.
At the time that White joined the Supreme Court
administrative law was almost non-existent. It would
be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this field
of law today. Because White's long service on the
bench (27 years) coincided with the need to spell
out the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in regulating the railroad industry and because of
White's interest and aptitude in this field, this branch
of the law owes more to White than to any other
judge. In fact, he might be called the Father of Ad­
ministrative Law in the "case and controversy" sense,
as Ernst Freund is the Father of the academic con­
sideration of administrative law.
The rise of government by administrative body was
inevitable. With the passing of the frontier and the
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growth in size and complexity of economic and social
life, it became evident that there would have to be
comparable development in the machinery of govern­
ment. The tasks were becoming too many to be car­
ried out by old agencies of government, separated
from each other in three branches, executive, legisla­
tive and judicial. A new system was evolving. A
particular area of governmental concern would be
set aside by Congress and entrusted to a new agency
which would have governmental power (partly legis­
lative, partly executive and partly judicial) in the
field assigned it. The prototype of this new form of
organization, the regulatory commission, was the
Interstate Commerce Commission created in 1887.
Immediately following the Civil War there was a
great period of railroad building. This railroad ex­
pansion was subsidized by grants of right of way,
loans, subsidies and outright gifts of millions of acres
. of public land. Additionally, state governments, coun­
ties and municipalities almost competed with one
another in generosity to the railroad builders. In the
panic of 1873, the people of the Middle West and
Far West began to realize that they were not receiv­
ing the advantages that they had expected from the
railroads. There were abuses: exorbitant freight and
passenger rates, watered stock, discriminatory rebates
to powerful shippers, and free passes to state legis­
lators and other people of influence. These evils were
aggravated by the attitude of certain of the railroad
magnates. Thus Leland Stanford said, speaking to a
gathering of railroad officials, "There is no foundation
in good reason for the attempts made by the general
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government and by the states to especially control
your affairs. It is a question of might and it is to your
interest to have it determined where the power re­
sides."14
The American people endured the abuses with
extraordinary patience, believing "That government
governs best which governs least." However, in the
midwestern states there was a growing reaction and
the Illinois Constitution of 187015 contained a clause
directing the legislature to pass laws to prevent unjust
discrimination and extortionate rates of freight and
passenger tariff on the different railroads in the state.
The legislature then passed laws prohibiting discrim­
ination and establishing a maximum rate, and created
a railway and warehouse commission to regulate rail­
roads, grain elevators and warehouses. This legisla­
tion was denounced as socialistic, but when it reached
the United States Supreme Court, in Munn v Illinois/6
in 1876, Chief Justice Waite upheld the Illinois Stat­
ute as an extension of the historical right of the state
to regulate businesses with a public interest, such as,
inn-keepers, common carriers and ferries.
On the same day that the court sustained the valid­
ity of the Illinois Statute, it handed down decisions
approving the right of a state to establish maximum
freight and passenger rates."? The period of public
regulation of railroads by state governments lasted
about ten years. Then the United States Supreme
Court nullified an Illinois law attacking the "long and
short haul" evil!", and three years later the court
declared rate regulation by a state legislative com­
mission invalid.l" These decisions put an end to state
regulation of railroads. Congress responded with the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It specifically pro­
hibited pooling, rebates, discrimination of any char­
acter and higher charges for a short haul than for a
long haul. It provided that all charges be "reasonable
and just" and it required the roads to post their tariffs.
To administer this law Congress established the first
permanent administrative board of the American
Government, the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In 1906, the Hepburn Act authorized the Interstate
Commerce Commission to determine and prescribe
maximum rates.
Of course, ideas which are clear to us today were
not so at the time that White started to write his
famous opinions on the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion. It was White's contribution to the development
of law that he integrated the regulatory commis­
sion into our private and public common law, and
did it in such a way that it appears almost a child
of the common law. This was not an easy task be­
cause it involved the division of authority between
the national government and the states and the delin­
eation of the relationship of these new agencies to
the executive branch of the government, to Con-
gress and to the courts. Decisions by White and by
the court over which he presided established basic
principles, such as, that there had to be a definite
grant of governmental function to the commission by
Congress, that the commission had to follow proce­
dure consistent with due process of law, that when
the commission adopted a procedure, the parties had
a right to insist that it be followed-and perhaps most
important of all-that when the commission was given
a function of government to perform by Congress that
the courts would respect its role and not usurp it.
One of the important administrative law cases de­
cided by White was Texas & Pacific Railway v.
Abilene Cotton Oil CO.20 Justice Frankfurter explained
the significance of this decision: "In order to avoid
mischievous opportunities for the assertion of individ­
ual claims by shippers as against the common interest
of uniformity in construing railroad tariffs, this Court
so construed the Interstate Commerce Act in the
famous Abilene Cotton Oil case as to withdraw from
the shipper the historic common law right to sue in
the courts for charging unreasonable rates. It re­
quired resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission
because not to do so would result in the impairment
of the general purpose of that Act. It did so because
even though theoretically this Court could ultimately
review such adjudications imbedded in the various
judicial judgments-if a shipper could go to a court
in the first instance-there would be considerations
of fact which this Court could not possibly disentangle
so as to secure the necessary uniformity. The benef­
icent rule in the Abilene Cotton Oil case was evolved
by reading the Interstate Commerce Act not as though
it were a collection of abstract words, but by treating
it as an instrument of government growing out of
long experience with certain evils and addressed to
their correction. Chief Justice White's opinion in that
case was characterized by his successor, Chief Justice
Taft, as a 'conspicuous instance of his unusual and
remarkable power and facility in statesmanlike inter­
pretation of statute law'." Finally, Justice Frankfurter
epitomizes his evaluation of White's opinion as "A
creative act of adjudication unanimously accom­
plished.">'
Another of White's precedents in administrative law
is Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan.t? This
case involved the validity of a congressional act em­
powering a custom's official to impose penalties. The
statute was attacked on the ground that the imposition
and enforcement of penalties was primarily a judicial
function. White rejected the contention because it
magnified the judicial to the detriment of all other
departments of the government. The effect of this
case was to give greater scope to the action of admin­
istrative agencies, and, like Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison, to define the power of the
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In the case of East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commissioni" White
held that substantial findings of fact of the commission
made after hearings were not subject to review if they
had not been questioned in the lower court. In
another case he further developed the law with regard
to findings of fact made by an administrative body
to support its determination to the effect that if the
findings by the commission were not of sufficiently
substantial character to sustain the order then the
court did not have the duty to undertake an independ­
ent investigation of the facts in order to substantiate
the order."
Another decision of White was U. S. ex rel Kansas
City Southern Railway v. Interstate Commerce Com­
mission.26 An amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act empowered the Commission to evaluate property
owned bv a common carrier. The commission failed
to do thi� even at the request of the railway, claiming
that it was impossible to arrive at an evaluation. White
held that the Commission had erred in refusing to
exercise the authority granted to it, and that in so
doing, it was actually assuming authority it did not
possess.
A landmark decision of White in this field was U. S.
v. Sante Fe,27 wherein speaking of the commissioner
of the general land office and his subordinates, White
held that the function of government sought to be
exercised by the administrative body must be one
which comes under the role assigned to the body by
Congress.
White, in another case, stated the basis of judicial
review of administrative rulings as follows: 28
"Beyond controversy, in determining whether an
order of the commission shall be suspended or set
Continued on page 40
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aside, we must consider, a, all relevant questions of
constitutional power, or right; b, all pertinent ques­
tions as to whether the administrative order is within
the scope of the delegated authority under which it
purports to have been made; and, c, a proposition
which we state independently, although in its essence
it may be contained in the previous one, viz., whether,
even although the order be in form within the dele­
gated power, nevertheless it must be treated as not
embraced therein, because the exertion of authority
which is questioned has been manifested in such an
unreasonable manner as to cause it, in truth, to be
within the elementary rule that the substance, and
not the shadow, determines the validity of the exer­
cise of the power . . . Plain as it is that the powers
just stated are of the essence of judicial authority,
and which, therefore, may not be curtailed, and whose
discharge may not be by us in a proper case avoided,
it is equally plain that such perennial powers lend no
support whatever to the proposition that we may,
under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp
merely administrative functions by setting aside a
lawful administrative order upon our conception as
to whether the administrative power has been wisely
exercised."
Speaking of this case and of two others handed
down by White on the same day, Edward H. Mosely,
Secretary of the Commission, wrote to F. W. Car­
penter, then Taft's secretary, explaining, "I am sen�ing
three opinions of the Supreme Court of the Umted
States, speaking through Mr. Justice White, which
were rendered last Monday and which so strongly
h h f h C
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strengt en t e power 0 t e omrmssion.
In a letter to Laski, Holmes said ", . , I think the
credit is wholly his (White's) about making the re­
lations between the Interstate Commerce Commission
and our court clear and putting the whole important
business on a sound and workable footing."30
Chief Justice Taft in speaking of White's opinions
in this field said: "( They) are models of clear and
satisfactory reasoning which give to the people, to
state legislatures, to Congress, and the courts a much
needed knowledge of the practical functions the Com­
merce Commission was to discharge, and of how they
were to be reconciled to existing government ma­
chinery . . . They are conspicuous instances of his
unusual and remarkable power for facts and states­
manlike interpretation of statute law."31
Somewhat similar to the need to control and reg­
ulate the railroad industry was the need to control the
great combinations of wealth that grew up in America
toward the end of the 19th century. Laws to regulate
trusts and monopolies were motivated by the desire
to end corrupt and dishonest practices and by the
fear that the natural resources of the country were
being ruthlessly exhausted and that small businessmen
were being faced with ruin. In 1890, the Sherman
Act was passed by Congress. Every contract, com­
bination, in the form of trusts or otherwise, or con­
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations was declared to
be illegal, and every person who should monopolize
or attempt to monopolize any part of trade or com­
merce among the several states was made guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Taken literally the Sherman Act would have forbid­
den almost every contract or combination. White
would not accept such an indiscriminate application
of the law. In his famous dissent in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.,32 166 U. S. 200, 351,
( 1897) he argued, "To define the words 'In restraint
of trade' as embracing every contract which in any
degree produced that effect would be violative of
reason because it would include all those contracts
which are the very essence of trade and would be
equivalent to saying that there should be no trade,
therefore, nothing to restrain." The dilemma which
would necessarily arise from defining the words (con­
tracts in restraint of trade) so as to destroy by render­
ing illegal the contracts upon which trade �epends,
and yet pre-supposing that trade would contmue and
should not be restrained, is shown by the argument
advanced, and which has been compelled by the
exigency of the premise upon which it is based."
The following year the Addyston Pipe case ap­
peared on appeal before the 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals." William Howard Taft wrote the opinion
for the court. In sustaining the government's conten­
tion, that the combine in question was illegal, Judge
Taft began by stating that the (majority) opinion in
the Trans-Missouri case would he a sufficient answer
to the defendants, since the majority opinion held
every restraint of trade to be forbidden by the Sher­
man Act. However, he then proceeded, by an analysis
of the authorities, to show that the practices of the
defendants could not be considered reasonable in the
common law sense. Five years later suit was brought
by the government to dissolve the holding company
set up by Hill, Morgan and Harriman, the Northern
Securities case.33a The majority held that there was
a violation of the Sherman Act. There were four
dissenters: White, Fuller, Peckham and Holmes, on
the ground that the Sherman Act did not apply to
contracts concerning the ownership of stock.
It was in the Standard Oil34 and American Tobacco
cases'" that White, then Chief Justice, speaking for
the court, with only Harlan dissenting, defined and
explained the rule of reason, distinguishing between
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those economic combinations that were harmful and
those that were useful in modern society.
Two criticisms have been made of the rule of
reason: first, that it was obiter dictum because the
Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Com­
pany were violative of the Sherman Anti-trust Act
under any interpretation. Therefore there was no need
of a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable
restraints of trade. Secondly, that in basing the rule of
reason on common law principles White erred in that
the common law only made the distinction between
reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade in the
matter of contracts that were ancillary to a main con­
tract of sale and reasonably adapted and limited to
the contract's lawful purpose. The charge that the
"rule of reason" concept does not comport with the
common law is well answered by quotations from
Justice Stone and from Justice Holmes.
Justice, later Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone, said:
"In seeking more effective protection of the public
from the growing evils of restraints on the competitive
system effected by the concentrated commercial power
of 'trusts' and 'combinations' at the close of the nine­
teenth century, the legislators found ready at their
hand the common law concept of illegal restraints of
trade or commerce. In enacting the Sherman law they
took over that concept by condemning such restraints
wherever they occur in or affect commerce between
the states. They extended the condemnation of the
statute to restraints effected by any combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, as well
as by contract or agreement, having those effects on
the competitive system and on purchasers and con­
sumers of goods or services which were characteristic
of restraints deemed illegal at common law, and they
gave both private and public remedies for the injuries
flowing from such restraints.
"That such is the scope and effect of the Sherman
Act was first judicially recognized and expounded in
the classic opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. (CCA 6th) 85 F 271, affirmed in 175
U. S. 211, written by Judge, later Chief Justice Taft,
and concurred in by Justice Harlan and Judge, later
Justice Lurton of this court. This court has since re­
peatedly recognized that the restraints at which the
Sherman law is aimed, and which are described by its
terms are only those which are comparable to re­
straints deemed illegal at common law, although ac­
complished by means other than contract and which,
for constitutional reasons, are confined to transactions
in or which affect interstate commerce.
"In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1,
54,55, 58, decided in 1911, this court, speaking through
Chief Justice White, pointed out that the restraint of
trade contemplated by section 1 of the Act took its
origin from the common law, and that the Sherman
Act was adapted to the prevention, in modern con­
ditions, of conduct or dealing effecting the wrong, at
which the common law doctrine was aimed. This, it
was said, is 'the dread of enhancement of prices and
of other wrongs which it was thought would flow
from the undue limitation on competitive conditions
caused by contracts or other acts of individuals or
corporations ...
' The court declared, page 59, that
'the statute was drawn in the light of the existing
practical conception of the law of restraint of trade,'
and drew the conclusion that the restraints which were
condemned by the statute are those which, following
the common law analogy are 'unreasonable or undue:
This view was followed and more explicitly stated in
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.
106, 169, where it was said:
'
... it was held in the
Standard Oil Co. Case that as the words 'restraint of
trade' at common law and in the law of this country
at the time of the adoption of the Antitrust Act only
embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combina­
tions which operated to the prejudice of the public
interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly
obstructing the due course of trade or which, either
because of their inherent nature or effect or because
of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously re­
strained trade, that the words as used in the statute
were designed to have and did have but a like signif­
icance.' In thus grounding the 'rule of reason' upon
the analogy of the common law doctrines applicable
to illegal restraints of trade the court gave a content
and meaning to the statute in harmony with its history
and plainly indicated by its legislative purpose."36
Justice Holmes said in one of his letters to Mr. Wu,
"In Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 377, a
man was indicted under the Sherman Antitrust Act for
a conspiracy in restraint of trade and to monopolize
trade. It was objected that as a criminal statute the
law was bad, because it had been construed to pro­
hibit only such contracts and combinations as unduly
restricted competition or unduly obstructed the
course of trade, and so construed it was too indefinite
for a criminal law. But in the opinion I pointed out,
p. 377, that 'the law is full of instances where a man's
fate depends on his estimating right, that is, as the
jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree,'
that an act might be murder, manslaughter or mis­
adventure according to the degree of danger attending
it according to common experience in the circum­
stances known to the actor. As I put it in a later case
. . . 'The conditions are as permanent as anything
human, and a great body of precedents on the civil
side coupled with familiar practice make it com­
paratively easy for common sense to keep to what is
f '''37sa e.
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That White's construction of the Sherman Act was
beneficial is generally conceded by his critics. Pro­
fessor Dishman in his article on "Mr. Justice White
and the Rule of Reason,"38 although rejecting the
common law historical basis of the rule of reason,
states: "This is not to say, as some critics have said,
that the rule has seriously hampered the Depart­
ment of Justice in enforcing the antitrust law. We
have it on the authority of Thurman Arnold that
without the rule the Sherman Act would have been
unworkable because every combination between two
men in business is in some measure a restraint of trade.
The rule, he has said, has the effect of preventing the
antitrust law from destroying the efficiency of those
combinations which are actually serving, instead of ex-
ploiting, the consumer."39
.
There is not space to discuss White's contribution to
other fields of law. However, someone is bound to
raise the question, where did White stand on the great
social issues of his day? Was he a liberal?-like Holmes?
It is impossible to squeeze the massive White into a
pigeonhole however labelled. There is always a de­
mand to put Supreme Court Judges into categories.
It eliminates the need to examine what they decided
or to read what they said-we know all about them
from the label.
First and foremost White was a lawyer. To him the
law was a discipline in the academic sense with its
own goals and methodology. When he decided cases
before him, he decided them according to legal stand­
ards, that is, the law he found in the constitution, the
statutes and the case precedents, with a permissible
leeway allowed judges, as it is expressed by Cardozo,
"as new problems arise, equity and justice will direct
the mind to solutions which will be found, when they
are scrutinized, to be consistent with symmetry and
order or even to be a starting point of a symmetry
and order theretofore unknown."39a That White had a
classical notion of "facts" as well as law is shown by
his remark to counsel during the oral arguments of
Stettler v. O'Hara,40 "Mr. Frankfurter, I could gather
twice as much material to show that private property
is wrong and should be abolished,"41 manifesting a re­
luctance to regard sociological data gathered upon a
hypothesis as the equivalent of evidence emerging
from direct and cross-examination.
His rule of reason in the antitrust cases and his per­
sistent interest in the new field of administrative law­
defined by Dean Pound as "that branch of modern law
under which the executive department of government
. . . interferes with the conduct of the individual for
the purpose of promoting the well-being of the com­
munity . . ,"42 is evidence that White had a feeling
for the unity of society.43 Freedom is seen by him as
not freedom from the obligations of association with
others but as freedom to associate. Judge Hershey of
the Illinois Supreme Court expressed the same idea
when he regarded the criminal law as if it was the ex­
pression of the minimal social duty exacted of the in­
dividual by the government. 44
White sensed that the danger to be avoided in
social reform was that it might destroy society by
fragmenting it. He knew society only existed by
reason of people combining together formally and in­
formally in countless ways. The search for a balance­
the compromise that would leave men free to associate
and yet guide their associating so that it would serve
the well-being of the community-may explain his dis­
sent in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case
where White said "the construction which reads the
rule of reason out of the statute embraces within its
inhibition every contract or combination by which
working men seek to peaceably better their condition."
It may explain his adherence to the majority in the
Coppage45 and Adair cases'? which struck down legis­
lation forbidding employers to discriminate against
a workman because he belonged to a union if his
action is judged wrong in these instances.
During White's time in the court, with White voting
with the majority, the following legislation was up­
held:
A state law limiting the hours of work in minesr'?
A state law limiting the hours of work for women.t"
The Illinois Child Labor law;49
State workmen's compensation laws; 50
A state law setting up safety regulations for coal
mines.P!
A state law requiring that script used to pay miners
be redeemed in cash;52
A state law requiring that coal be weighed before it
was screened in computing the wages of miners.:"
A state law forbidding contracts to limit the liability
of an employer for injuries sustained by his work­
men.v'
A state law prohibiting pool rooms.i"
A state law requiring that private employment
agencies be licensed?" was upheld but one abolishing
private employment agencies was overthrown."?
The Federal Employers Liability Act was upheld.r"
The Adamson Act limiting hours of railroad workers
and for the duration of a specific emergency fixing
their wages was upheld.!"
The state right to fix intra state rates was upheld.s"
The grandfather's test of eligibility for voting was
held bad;61
A city ordinance forbidding negroes to live in a
particular area if more than half the householders
were white was held invalid; 62
The power of a congressional committee to punish
for contempt was limited.'"
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However, an act of Congress forbidding the interstate
transportation of goods manufactured by child labor
was held unconstitutional.v' and White silently dis­
sented in the case upholding war time rent control
during World War I. 65
White's last judicial act was his dissent in the New­
berry Case.v" There White insisted, against the
majority, that the Federal Government did have
jurisdiction over primary contests.
In conclusion, I think to understand the greatness
of White, we have to see it apart from the subject
matter of his decisions. He is a great man because he
typifies the Judge in society. You recall the famous
controversy between Sir Edward Coke and James the
First. 67 James the First had given judgment in a case
that arose concerning the ownership of land. Coke, on
behalf of the court, set the King's judgment aside.
Then the King said that he thought the law was
founded upon reason and that he and others had
reason as well as judges, to which it was answered by
Coke, as he reports it, that no doubt His Majesty had
great endowments of nature but His Majesty was not
learned in the laws of his realm and cases are not to be
decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason
and judgment of law, which law is an act which re­
quires long study and experience. At another time,
Coke remarked that the law was "an artificial perfec­
tion of reason gotten by long study, observation and
experience and not of every man's natural reason; for
nemo nascitur artifex."68 This might be translated
"N0 one is a born Judge."
White is the type of the professional judge. This is
shown by his expertness in procedure. In a sense
procedure is the beginning of competence in the art
of being a lawyer or a judge, because procedural law
is the means by which litigants obtain the benefits of
other laws. When White went on the Supreme Court
a great number of cases involving questions of pro­
cedure were turned over to him. The same thing is
true of his service on the state court. This is unusual.
Ordinarily, questions of procedure and jurisdiction are
decided by the chief justice of an appellate court or
are assigned by him to one of the senior associates.
It is one of the noteworthy things of White's judicial
service that 54 of the 80 cases decided by him on the
Louisiana Supreme Court were concerned with pro­
cedure, and about one-third of all the cases decided
by White in the United States Supreme Court were
concerned with procedural questions.v?
From the lawyer's standpoint procedure is the ad­
venture of the law, and from a judge's standpoint,
procedure pertains to the due process according to
which he decides controversies. In the field of ad­
ministrative law, for example, reviewing courts insist
that administrative agencies act consistently with
their own procedures. To' a degree, the acceptance of
the belief that procedure is of little importance is a
yielding on the ideal of government by law and not by
personalities.
James the First was not the last legal primitive. The
simplicist notion of law is the cause of a great deal of
misunderstanding, and of unfair criticism of the courts.
When Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth was a young man
in New England it was expressed as follows: The
common law was only "adapted to a people grown
old in the habits of vice" while the law which the
courts of Connecticut administered "was derived from
the law of nature and of revelation.Y? The voice of
this tradition is sometimes heard today in criticisms of
decisions of the Supreme Court.
The law is the dividing of the big truths which, to
quote Arthur Miller, "define humanity and the right
way to live, so that the world is a home and not a
battlefield, or a fog in which disembodied spirits pass
each other without recognition"71 into the little truths
by which everyday life may be regulated. What the
law is trying to do in the field of action is a little like
Morris Cohen's search for concepts with a smaller
twilight zone in the field of reasoning." This is not
done in any free hand style. White's opinions, like the
judgments and opinions of other competent judges, are
a painstaking practice of an ancient art according to
its own tested methods.
White's opinions are also an answer to the sophis­
ticates, who would require such certainty of legal
definition that the law would be straight jacketed and
alike unable to serve the community, or do justice
between individuals.
By honoring White our faith and pride in our tradi­
tion of justice by means of the law is renewed. We
may hold our heads a little higher because Edward
Douglass White lived.
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